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The Mojahedin-e Khalq's thinking framework is designed in such a way that it does not actually confront the obstacles in its path. But this re-routing to avoid obstructions and dead-ends and this smashing through any obstacles has never been based on logic, management or intelligent analysis. The group simply abandons the game that isn't working and starts a different one, describing that as a breakthrough; an acrobatic feat based on jumping from one rope to another.
The Mojahedin-e Khalq's thinking framework is designed in such a way that it does not actually confront the obstacles in its path. But this re-routing to avoid obstructions and dead-ends and this smashing through any obstacles has never been based on logic, management or intelligent analysis. The group simply abandons the game that isn't working and starts a different one, describing that as a breakthrough; an acrobatic feat based on jumping from one rope to another. This is why the Mojahedin's ideological and military theories rapidly lost colour, and the theory which was intended to grow them into an alternative to the ruling regime of Iran instead turned them into an opportunist group which constantly hangs in a state of "to be or not to be", so that all its energy has been devoted to its survival and the highest prices are paid just to remain on the scene. The Mojahedin's systematic, total dependency on foreign forces and its tactic of self inflicted wounding has forced a crisis of identity and hopelessness in the cult. In the end this has reduced them to such tools that any bodies imaginable can take advantage of them and use them as hostages for bargaining with other bodies. The choice of armed struggle and guerrilla warfare inside cities has engaged Mr Rajavi's apparatus in a gambling game in which there is no other way except a total win or a total loss (the winner takes all). There is no third way for him. Mr Rajavi's belief was that, counting on his devoted ideological forces, he would be able to topple the Iranian regime in a very short time. He pretended to his members that the day after the downfall of the regime, it will be the foreign forces who would have to come and beg from the victors. The regime's refusal to be toppled according to Rajavi's planned timetable, despite rivers of blood, forced the Mojahedin to change direction and cry for help from foreign powers. Mr Rajavi has, through experience, discovered that the realization of his dreams needs to be blessed by foreign elements, and that neglecting their interests in favour of his own would make the path so difficult and uncertain that it would distance him from his aim (power) and would challenge his strategy (armed struggle). It didn't take long before foreign powers provided support to the Mojahedin in the form of Saddam's regime in order to accelerate the downfall of the regime. It was from this guidance that Mr Rajavi found what he was looking for and found his twin in thoughts, Saddam Hussein. He took Saddam as his role model and started adjusting the internal relations of the Mojahedin according that of Saddam's Ba'ath Party. Shortly afterwards, Mr Abrishamchi (Rajavi's deputy) invited all the organisation's forces to Iraq and announced that whoever stayed in Europe would become a burned card because the only way to topple the regime would be from the lands adjacent to the country. That is, Iraq. Practicing this theory, the MKO forces fell in totality under the command of Saddam Hussein. And to answer his forces' questions in respect of capitulating to Saddam, Rajavi employed well known psychological methods [brainwashing]. The fall of Saddam was such a painful shock to the MKO that they could never have envisaged or imagined its possibility. But this did happen, and it placed the organization in a complicated situation - especially since the MKO was already in the lists of terrorist entities which severely reduced its ability to manoeuvre on the international scene. With the fall of its benefactor, the whole National Liberation Army was captured and taken prisoner and the fate of the cult fell completely into the hands of the west. This was to the extent that orders would occasionally be dictated to them in public. In this way, three unwritten demands were imposed on the cult: 1- The exclusion of Massoud Rajavi as the Ideological leader (the meaningful disappearance of Massoud Rajavi). 2- Change the strategy of armed struggle to political struggle (the deadlock of the NLA). 3- Change the name of the Mojahedin- Khalq Organisation (keeping the name MKO in the terrorist list and instead giving permit to the National Council of Resistance). The west has never regarded the MKO as an alternative to the ruling regime of Iran, but will always consider it as an aggravating force to use against Iran in bargaining with that country. Therefore in the challenges between the Iranians and the outside world, Rajavi's cult has always played the role of hostage. They are the ones to be sacrificed in the making and breaking of deals between whichever two players. And in this situation the Mojahedin have celebrated many times over that they are still breathing and physically alive! A- The victorious US forces, in Iraq in coordination with the interim government of Iraq, and against what is called the interference of the regime of Tehran in Baghdad, regard the captured forces of the Mojahedin cult as a possibly useful tool against the Iranian regime. In fact the MKO has been taken hostage to be used in deals. Otherwise, considering the overwhelming amount of evidence and documents, Mr Rajavi would surely be sitting alongside Mr Hassan Almajid (Chemical Ali) in a court of justice. B- In the negotiations between Iran and the EU, the EU needs to use something like the MKO as the stick to increase the price of its carrot. That is why the EU has taken the Mojahedin as its hostage to be utilised in these deals. Otherwise, according to all the documented evidence that put them on the list of terrorist groups, the relevant processes to prosecute them in big numbers would already be underway. C-The US administration knows full well of course about the sectarian and terrorist nature of the cult under the leadership of Mr and Mrs Rajavi. But the various challenges it launches against the Iranian regime do not allow it to ignore even a useless tool like the Mojahedin. The administration takes as a minimum of its rights to keep the cult as a hostage to be used for its own aims. Otherwise, without doubt the administration could have easily prescribed the same medicine it gave Bin Laden to Mr and Mrs Rajavi. D- For years the Iranian regime has been describing itself as the victim of terrorism by the MKO. It has knowingly tried to keep the MKO file open and pay any price so it would not close. In this way it has kept the Mojahedin as a hostage to be deployed on rainy days. E- But the inside of the Mojahedin is not much different from the outside either. In reality all the forces under the command of the cult are either direct hostages of Mr and Mrs Rajavi (like the forces in Ashraf camp) or indirectly, and with the aid of psychological coercion, have become their hostages.In all the above cases the hostage status of the Mojahedin is obvious and in none of them is there any intention or willingness to consider them as an alternative. Any real alternative has no choice but to be built on the foundation of the masses and the people and it is exactly the absence of this that Rajavi's cult is suffering from. Any tool could potentially have a use in some place or time, and therefore it is logical not to throw it away. But the moment a more advanced tool has been created or whenever the time for using such a tool arises, the old tools will be collected up automatically. Unfortunately this anti-logic works even in the field of politics where some give themselves permission to use terrorists as tools. Because humans are the main victims of such games, as long as terror and violence and dictatorship is considered a logical way to break a deadlock, then the amount of murder and crime will only increase. The terrorist MKO cult, which carries with it a full history of mercenary status for Saddam's regime on its back, is now a helpless hostage. But from the point of view of opportunists, it is a useful tool to ask for ransom. In this game, whoever can play the role of Saddam better, will benefit most from Rajavi's cult.

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